First Manassas Battlefield Troop Movements.
In the text, the red numbers in parentheses
refer to the numbers
on this map.
On August 4, 1861, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, Commander of the U. S.
forces, wrote a description of the battle of First Manassas (or Bull Run):
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME 2 [S# 2] -- CHAPTER IX.
JULY 16-22, 1861.--The Bull Run, or Manassas, Campaign, Virginia.
No. 6 -- Reports of Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, commanding U. S. forces.
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT NORTHEASTERN VIRGINIA,
Arlington, Va., August 4, 1861.
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Va. It has been delayed
till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders
to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.
In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my
intention to move that afternoon and drive the enemy from the east
side of Bull Run, so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently
accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements. Later in
the day they had obtained enough information of the passages across
the stream to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to
move without further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road
a few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a
shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those who had the
greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning
and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near
Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville
about seven miles to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses,
mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road
from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs along this ridge, and crosses
Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike,
which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the village,
and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course
between the crossings from northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the
north side of the Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the
Centreville ridge; two brigades on the same road and a mile and a half in
advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on the road from Centreville
to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General
Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
The Second Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile
east of Centreville.
The Third Division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old Braddock
road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a
half from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third Division,
and between it and Centreville.
... Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents
were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three
days' rations in their haversacks ... Saturday orders ... were issued for the
available force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance
of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out
the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair
of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too strong at that point for
us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did, that it would
bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired.
Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road
crossed Bull Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery
in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis.
The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles
above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which
was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford,
and, after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and
the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge to send
out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up
the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the
Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been held in check by
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the
Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's
division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub
Run, turn to the right and north, and move by a wood road around to the upper
ford, and then turn south and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's
division to follow Hunter's as far as the turning-off place to the lower ford,
where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's
division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville
I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to
Centreville along this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to
the front and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be
turned by him by this road. For if he should once obtain possession of this
ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs
of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I
had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer
to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front farther than
to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on
the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at
this season. There was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on
the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three
hours behind the time appointed--a great misfortune, as events turned out. The
wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer
than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the
road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.
General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not
reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in
our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by
Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I
held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send
any troops back to re-enforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved
forward as directed in the general order.
On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of
Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting
over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction
of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it
might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get
over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break
from the column, and come for-ward separately as fast as possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's
division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp
sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as
large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division
which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south,
and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford,
thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance
the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford
the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther
large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what
became the field of battle, through the valley of a small water-course, a
tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this open
space, and whilst the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front
and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following
it up with infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time
without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was
sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's
brigade and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left
forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of
Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded by
Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and
down to the road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this
was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream
and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road
down which our troops had marched from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm
house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had early in the day some of his
most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another
hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the contest
was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Willcox's and Howard's
brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry
under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's
brigade of Tyler's division in the center and up the road, whilst Keyes'
brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near
the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery of Burnside's brigade also
participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The
enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a
part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of
the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who
succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and
allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in disabling the battery, and
then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in
succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses being
killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the
repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond
it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before
this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road,
which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our
engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across the road to
allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting
since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the
afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made
what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into
action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than 9½ miles; and
though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before,
many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or
during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe
fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the
first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken,
were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from
the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the
residue of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right,
and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and
retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which
there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the
reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry
alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there
maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton
turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The
plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those
with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon
degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had
assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost
the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to
recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to
protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the
appearance, at least, of organization and force.
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by
Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps
coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became
intermingled, and all organization was lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward
and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this
purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to
the right left the main road.
By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the operations
were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the
brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that
of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan
was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for
considerable time and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the
artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much
firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it
were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be
captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's
brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be
stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to
Centreville, on the march, under orders from the division commander, for
Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best
line of defense across the ridge that their then position admitted of; and
subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of the Army, I caused
such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and
Second New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve
before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through
Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run,
and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much
damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and
caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons
and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in
this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road
encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the
ambulances carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became
a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The
condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the
men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the
day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the
mass of the Army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted--division
and brigade commanders and staff--to admit of no alternative but to fall back;
the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of
the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as
they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops,
most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to
the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them
At -- o'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat,
which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax
Station, leaving by the cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had
been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House
till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out
soldiers were not left behind.
I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders,
to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a
consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the
latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to 19 officers and 462
non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to 64 officers and
947 non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be
able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from
further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing
having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the zouaves
to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday
reduced to 174. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more
correct return can be made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of
their forces, coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded,
and other information shows this to be much under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman
say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there
reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return, and
have gone to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance
on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no
credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior
in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own
ground on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of
necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given
to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not
To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not embraced
in the reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their
reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring
that on this subject of persons, &c., they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as such during
the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when
required, and doing all that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the
columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for
them the best the circumstances admitted.
.... As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation
of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein
stated, I trust it may not be considered out of place if I refer, in a few
words, to the immediate antecedents of the battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal
instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the
time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of
the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the
regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many
of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon,
and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together
before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was
a further and unavoidable cause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his
favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c.,
and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for
more than a week after the time appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should
move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer
than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still
deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their
being procured in time to follow me.
The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and
wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and
disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward,
making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on
I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we
did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken
us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into
action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax
Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was
impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna,
about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther to
Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were
foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time
they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow
pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed
to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not
used to carrying even the lead of "light marching order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth Division
(Miles') and Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and
Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the
road near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers
opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid
even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could
which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the
17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I engaged not
to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in
the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General
Butler, and I knew every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this
should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be
because he would be driven in and followed by General Patterson. But,
from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them all, this
was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in
numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his
supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax
Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under
Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and
those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which
is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was
ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say;
certainly much more than we attacked them with.
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay.
A large and the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months'
volunteers, whose terms of service were about expiring, but who were sent
forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the
battery of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of
service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as
pressing a request as I could pen, and the honorable Secretary of War, who was
at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five
days, but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted;
and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into battle, these troops
moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best
armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words,
every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.
In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo,
that the general order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight
modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over
Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and
that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement ordered was carrying us
successfully to the object we had proposed before starting--that of getting
to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on
it far enough to break up and destroy the communication, and interpose
between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we
have fought a day--yes, a few hours--sooner, there is everything to show that
we should have continued successful, even against the odds with which we
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Lieut. Col. E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.
(Spelling and grammarical errors are in the original text. References to
attached documents and lists of names have been omitted - Ed.)
Some results of the battle of First Manassas:
- Confederate General Barnard Bee and Colonel Francis Bartow were killed.
- Both the South and the North realized that the war would be long and costly.
- General McDowell was relieved of command of the Union army.
- Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan began reorganizing and training the Union
- Southern General Thomas J. Jackson would forever be called "Stonewall"
(Text Sources: Many and varied, including the U.S. Gov't, National Park
Confederate Winter Quarters After First Manassas.