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U. S. CIVIL WAR
PHOTOGRAPHS
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REPORTS OF GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE
(PAGE 4 OF 5)
Source: O.R.-- Series I--Volume XI/2 (With Editing - Ed)
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BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.
Early on July 1 Jackson reached the battle-field of the previous day, having
succeeded in crossing White Oak Swamp, where he captured a part of the enemy's
artillery and a number of prisoners. He was directed to continue the pursuit down
the Willis Church road, and soon found the enemy occupying a high range,
extending obliquely across the road, in front of Malvern Hill. On this position of
great natural strength he had concentrated his powerful artillery, supported by
masses of infantry, partially protected by earthworks. His left rested near Crew's
house and his right near Binford's. Immediately in his front the ground was open,
varying in width from a quarter to half a mile, and, sloping gradually from the
crest, was completely swept by the fire of his infantry and artillery. To reach
this open ground our troops had to advance through a broken and thickly-wooded
country, traversed nearly throughout its whole extent by a swamp passable at but
few places and difficult at those. The whole was within range of the batteries on
the heights and the gunboats in the river, under whose incessant fire our movements
had to be executed.
Jackson formed his line with Whiting's division on his left and D. H. Hill's on his
right, one of Ewell's brigades occupying the interval. The rest of Ewell's and
Jackson's own divisions were held in reserve. Magruder was directed to take
position on Jackson's right, but before his arrival two of Huger's brigades came
up and were placed next to Hill. Magruder subsequently formed on the right of
these brigades, which, with a third of Huger's, were placed under his command.
Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve and took no part in the engagement.
Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary
communication, and the extreme difficulty of the ground, the whole line was not
formed until a late hour in the afternoon. The obstacles presented by the woods
and swamp made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to
oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy,
while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for its use and none
for its proper concentration. Orders were issued for a general advance at a given
signal, but the causes referred to prevented a proper concert of action among the
troops. D.H. Hill pressed forward across the open field and engaged the enemy
gallantly, breaking and driving back his first line; but a simultaneous advance of
the other troops not taking place, he found himself unable to maintain the ground
he had gained against the overwhelming numbers and numerous batteries of the enemy.
Jackson sent to his support his own division and that part of Ewell's which was in
reserve, but owing to the increasing darkness and intricacy of the forest and swamp
they did not arrive in time to render the desired assistance. Hill was therefore
compelled to abandon part of the ground he had gained after suffering severe loss
and inflicting heavy damage upon the enemy. On the right the attack was gallantly
made by Huger's and Magruder's commands. Two brigades of the former commenced the
action; the other two were subsequently sent to the support of Magruder and Hill.
Several determined efforts were made to storm the hill at Crew's house. The
brigades advanced bravely across the open field, raked by the fire of a hundred
cannon and the musketry of large bodies of infantry. Some were broken and gave way,
others approached close to the guns, driving back the infantry, compelling the
advanced batteries to retire to escape capture, and mingling their dead with those
of the enemy. For want of concert among the attacking columns their assaults were
too weak to break the Federal line, and after struggling gallantly, sustaining and
inflicting great loss, they were compelled successively to retire. Night was
approaching when the attack began, and it soon became difficult to distinguish
friend from foe. The firing continued until after 9 p.m., but no decided
result was gained. Part of the troops were withdrawn to their original positions,
others remained on the open field, and some rested within a hundred yards of the
batteries that had been so bravely but vainly assailed. The general conduct of the
troops was excellent.- in some instances heroic. The lateness of the hour at which
the attack necessarily began gave the enemy the full advantage of his superior
position and augmented the natural difficulties of our own.
After seizing the York River Railroad on June 28 and driving the enemy across the
Chickahominy, as already narrated, the cavalry under General Stuart proceeded down
the railroad to ascertain if there was any movement of the enemy in that direction.
He encountered but little opposition, and reached the vicinity of the White House
on the 29th. At his approach the enemy destroyed the greater part of the immense
stores accumulated at that depot and retreated toward Fort Monroe. With one gun and
some dismounted men General Stuart drove off a gunboat which lay near the White
House and rescued a large amount of property, including more than 10,000 stands of
small-arms partially burned. Leaving one squadron at the White House, in compliance
with his orders, he returned to guard the lower bridges of the Chickahominy.
On the 30th he was directed to recross and co-operate with General Jackson. After a
long march he reached the rear of the enemy at Malvern Hill on the night of July 1
at the close of the engagement.
On July 2 it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, leaving
the ground covered with his dead and wounded, and his route exhibiting abundant
evidence of precipitate retreat. The pursuit was commenced, General Stuart with his
cavalry in the advance, but a violent storm, which prevailed throughout the day,
greatly retarded our progress. The enemy, harassed and closely followed by the
cavalry, succeeded in gaining Westover, on James River, and the protection of his
gunboats. He immediately began to fortify his position, which was one of great
natural strength, flanked on each side by a creek, and the approach to his front
commanded by the heavy guns of his shipping, in addition to those mounted in his
intrenchments. It was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view of the
condition of our troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly
for seven days under the most trying circumstances, it was determined to withdraw,
in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need.
Several days were spent in collecting arms and other property abandoned by the
enemy, and in the mean time some artillery and cavalry were sent below Westover
to annoy his transports.
On July 8 the army returned to the vicinity of Richmond.
Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its
escape was due to the causes already stated. Prominent among these is the want
of correct and timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character
of the country, enabled General McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to
add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing
columns; but regret that more was not accomplished gives way to gratitude to the
Sovereign Ruler of the Universe for the results achieved. The siege of Richmond
was raised, and the object of a campaign, which had been prosecuted after months
of preparation at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated.
More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers
of rank, 52 pieces of artillery, and upward of 35,000 stands of small-arms were
captured. The stores and supplies of every description which fell into our hands
were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by
the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of
dead and wounded left on every field, while his subsequent inaction shows in what
condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled.
The accompanying tables contain the lists of our casualties in the series of
engagements.
Among the dead will be found many whose names will ever be associated with the
great events in which they all bore so honorable a part. For these, as well as
for the names of their no less distinguished surviving comrades, who earned for
themselves the high honor of special commendation, where all so well discharged
their duty, reference must necessarily be made to the accompanying reports. But
I cannot forbear expressing my admiration of the noble qualities displayed, with
rare exceptions, by officers and men, under circumstances which demanded the
exercise of every soldierly virtue.
To the officers commanding divisions and brigades belongs the credit for the
management of their troops in action. The extent of the fields of battle, the
nature of the ground, and the denseness of the forests rendered more than general
directions impracticable.
To the officers of my staff I am indebted for constant aid during the entire
period. Colonels Chilton and Long, Majors Taylor, Venable, Talcott, and Marshall,
and Captain Mason were continuously with me on the field. General Pendleton, chief
of artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Corley, chief quartermaster; Lieutenant-Colonel
Cole, chief commissary; Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, chief of ordnance; Surgeon
Guild, medical director; Colonel Lay and Lieutenant-Colonel Harvie,
inspectors-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, chief engineer, attended
unceasingly to their several departments.
To the whole medical corps of the army I return my thanks for the care and
attention bestowed on the wounded.
Respectfully submitted.
R. E. LEE,
General.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va.
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